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COURT OF APPEALS OPINIQN
The Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision was ordered not
published.

That decision granted the Defendant's Motion for

Summary Disposition and summarily affirmed the trial court's
order (Appendix 1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case is succinctly set forth in the
Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals and reiterated
verbatim:
"Dopp filed a paternity proceeding alleging that Olch
was the father of her child. Olch disputed the
allegations of paternity. In February of 1980/ Olch and
Dopp, individually and "as guardian ad litem" for her
child, entered into a stipulation for settlement which
provided for a lump sum settlement of all claims as to
paternity, expenses of pregnancy, any education and
support expenses, inheritance rights and any claim
otherwise related to the allegations of the pleadings or
subject matter of the litigation. The Settlement
Agreement contained an express disclaimer of paternity
and a waiver of any rights to the child. Finally the
Agreement contained the following language regarding
disposition of the litigation:
5. 'Both parties agree not to initiate any
communications with the other party or members of
their family.'
6. 'The parties agree that upon payment of the
entire $16,500.00 and any accrued interest, the
above-entitled action shall be dismissed with
prejudice and upon the merits, each party to bear
his or her own costs.'
7. 'This agreement is conditioned upon approval of
the Court where the above-entitled action is
pending and a dismissal with prejudice of said
action.'
The document also contained an 'Order' which recited
that the Court approve the Agreement of Settlement, and
that the matter was continued without date. The Order
- 1 -

further provided 'the Defendant shall submit to the
Court an Order of Dismissal upon final payment of the
amounts referred to in the foregoing Agreement of
Settlement." The Order was signed on February 19, 1980
and filed on the same day.
On January 27, 1981, Dopp's counsel filed a Satisfaction
of Judgment acknowledging receipt of the settlement
amount and authorizing and directing the Court to enter
satisfaction. Although not conforming with the express
direction of the February 19, 1980 Order to prepare an
Order of Dismissal, the Satisfaction of Judgment was
clearly intended to culminate the paternity action.
In or about June of 1987, Olch caused an Order to Show
Cause to be issued requiring Dopp to appear and show why
she should not be held in contempt for initiating
communication with Olch and his family. The Court
declined to hold Dopp in contempt, but ordered that:
'It was the intent of the parties that no
communication be instigated between them or their
families and the Court now enters this Order that
neither party shall communicate with the other or
their families in any way, whether such
communication be written or verbal, or through
utilizing third parties.'
Dopp subsequently brought a Motion to Dismiss with
Prejudice and in the alternative, a Motion to Amend
Decree to allow for communication between the minor
child, Olch and his family. Both Motions were denied.
Dopp appealed, contending that the trial court erred in
"sua sponte" entering an order of no communication, in
refusing to dismiss the case, in not amending the
'Decree' based on 'changed circumstances, and in denying
appellant attorney's fees."
The Order to Show Cause was personally served upon Kathy
Dopp on May 22, 1987 (Appendix 2).

The original hearing date was

continued at the request of the Appellant's counsel and she later
appeared in person and with counsel at the hearing on June 29,
1987 (Appellant's Petition, Appendix 3).

ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF LACKS ACCURACY AND
CLARITY AND MUST BE DISMISSED ON ITS FACE
Petitioner's Brief is inaccurate and does not clarify issues
sufficiently to allow determination that review is appropriate in
this case, R. Utah S.Ct. No* 46(e)*
The Appellant states there has been no determination as to
paternity in this case, yet the District Court approved a
settlement which was signed by Ms. Dopp in 1980 (Appendix 3) and
entered an Order that Jonathan Olch was not the father of
Petitioner's child.

Satisfaction of Judgment was filed by Ms.

Dopp's lawyer in January, 1981 (Appendix 4). The validity of
that Order was not challenged for eight years.

It was later

upheld at the Order to Show Cause (Petitioner's Brief, Appendix
4) and by the Court of Appeals (Appendix 1).
Petitioner asserts vague claims, without authority to
support them, that she did not receive adequate notice of the
Order to Show Cause (Petitioner's Brief pp. 4,5). The Order to
Show Cause (Appendix 2) reflects it was personally served upon
her on May 22, 1987 and sets forth the purpose of the hearing as
an inquiry regarding violation of the Court Order of February 19,
1980; "that you not contact the Defendant or members of his
family".

Thereafter Petitioner appeared with her attorney at the

hearing.

The Court of Appeals found this argument to be "wholly

without merit" (Court of Appeals, Opinion, pg. 3, Appendix 1).
The Petition does not adequately or clearly describe what
the Petitioner wants or any authority requiring review.
- 3 -

II.
THE FACTUAL HISTORY AND SUMMARY
DISPOSITION BY THE COURT OF APPEALS CLEARLY
INDICATES THAT REVIEW IS UNNECESSARY
It is important to emphasize that the Court of Appeals
carefully reviewed the factual history of this case prior to
deciding that it should be summarily dismissed without the filing
of briefs.
The paternity action was filed over eight years ago and
disputed by Mr, Olch.

That proceeding was settled and the

settlement approved by the Court and required by § 78-45(a)-13
U.C.A. (1953, amended 1965).

Both parties signed the Stipulation

(Appendix 3) eight years ago.
In conformance with the Settlement Agreement and the Order
of the Courtf Ms. Dopp filed a complete and full Satisfaction of
Judgment in January, 1981. (See Appendix 4).

As part of that

Stipulation and Order Ms. Dopp was "not to initiate any
communication with the other party or members of their family"
(Appendix 3).

The Order to Show Cause only requested that she

comply with her stipulation and agreement and not harass Mr.
Olch.

Judge Sawaya did not find Ms. Dopp in contempt of court,

but simply issued an order that she live up to her earlier
stipulation and the ensuing Order that she not harass Mr. Olch
and his family (Appendix 5).
Besides the rules of this Court, the Petitioner relies upon
general references to the XIV Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and the due process clause of the Constitution
- 4 -

of Utah, Article 1, Section 7 (Petitioner's Brief, p. ii). Also,
in addition, three statutes are cited as authority, though none
of them are referred to in the argument (Petitioner's Brief, p.
2).

Those statutes are irrelevant and not dispositive of any of

the issues urged for consideration.
The first statute describes the discretionary nature of
review of this Court in considering the Petition, § 78-2-2(5)
U.C.A. (1953, amended 1986).
The second statute has nothing to do with this case at
all.

It is the title section of the Utah Exemptions Act, §78-23-

1 U.C.A 1953, amended 1981).
The third statute deals with attorney's fees in an action
commenced in bad faith, § 78-27-56 U.C.A. (1953, amended 1981).
In addition to the aforementioned, while not referred to in
Petitioner's Table of Authorities, the Brief also sets forth §
78-45A-1 et seq. , U.C.A. (1953) as being applicable to this
case.

None of those sections are referred to in the Brief.

That

section of the Utah Code is the Uniform Action Paternity under
which the original action was commenced in 1979.

Petitioner does

not contend there is any provision of that Act which is now
applicable.

III.
RESPONDENT SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS APPEAL.
Respondent respectfully requests this Court consider the
appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees as provided by
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and § 78-27-56
U.C.A. (1953, amended).

It would appear that the Petitioner has prosecuted this
appeal more for the purposes of harassing Mr. Olch, than
addressing any actual controversy.

The parties resolved their

differences approximately eight years ago.

Mr. Olch paid Ms.

Dopp the sum of $16,000.00 and a complete Satisfaction of
Judgment was entered by her attorney.

Eight years later she

commenced contacting and harassing Mr. Olch in direct violation
of an agreement she made and which was adopted and approved by
the District Court Judge.
Mr. Olch requested the assistance of the District Court in
encouraging Ms. Dopp to obey the earlier agreement.

This request

was upheld, not only by the District Court but on summary review
by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner now comes before this Court

asking it to review the appropriateness of the other Orders
without citing any substantive authority.
This case was resolved eight years ago and the sole
objective in these appeals by Ms. Dopp is to obtain legal
sanctions for the right to harass the Respondent.

There is no

other relief which can be afforded her nor has any other relief
ultimately been requested either in this Court or the court
below.
The Respondent would submit this is an appropriate
circumstance for an award of attorneyfs fees in favor of the
Respondent for the continued bad faith prosecution of these
appeals.

- 6 -

CONCLUSION
Respondent requests this Court that the Petition filed by
Kathy Ann Dopp be denied and Respondent be awarded his costs and
attorney's fees for this appeal and that which was perfected to
the Court of Appeals.
DATED this ) f

day of March, 1988.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copy of
the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI by United States first-class mail, postage prepaid, to
Robert Hansen, Attorney at Law, 320 South Fifth East, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102 on the

/ / day of namely 1988.^
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APPENDIX

Utah Court of Appeals Decision, Kathy Ann Dopp v.
Jonathan Olchy Case No. 87-572CA (1988)
Order to Show Case dated Hay 15, 1987
Agreement of Settlement and and Ord^r Approving
Settlement
Satisfaction of Judgment
Order of the District Court Sought to be Reviewed
Statutes § 78-2-2(5) U.C.A. (1953)
§ 78-23-1 U.C.A. (1953)
§ 78-27-56 U.C.A. (1953)
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FILED
JAN 61988
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAL^
ooOoo

Timothy M.Shw
. C t a * erftooCourt
"ten u*ur t of Appeals

Kathy Ann Dopp#
Plaintiff and Appellant,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

v.
Case ^o. 870572-CA
Jonathan Olch,
Defendant and Respondent.
Before Judges Davidson, Garff and Greenwood (On Law and Motion),

PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary
Disposition of appellant Kathy Ann Dopp (hereinafter HDoppM)
and on the Motion for Summary Disposition and Response of
respondent Jonathan Olch (hereinafter "01chM). We grant the
motion made by Olch and summarily affirm the trial court*s
order.
Dopp filed a paternity proceeding alleging that Olch was
the father of her child. Olch disputed the allegations of
paternity. In February of 1980, Olch and Dopp, individually
and Mas guardian ad litem" for her child, entered into a
stipulation for settlement which provided for a lump sum
settlement of all claims as to paternity, expenses of
pregnancy, any education and support expenses, inheritance
rights and any claim otherwise related to the allegations of
the pleadings or subject matter of the litigation. The
settlement agreement contained an express disclaimer of
paternity and a waiver of any rights to the child. Finally,
the agreement contained the following language regarding
disposition of the litigation:
5. MBoth parties agree not to initiate
any communications with the other party or
members of their family."
6. "The parties agree that upon the
payment of the entire $16,500.00 and any

accrued interest/ the above-entitled
action shall be dismissed with prejudice
and upon the merits, each party to bear
his or her own costs."
7. "This agreement is conditioned upon
the approval of the court where the
above-entitled action is pending and a
dismissal with prejudice of said action,M
The document also contained an "Order" which recited that the
court approved the Agreement of Settlement/ and that the matter
was continued without date. The Order further provided/ "The
defendant shall submit to the court an Order of Dismissal upon
final payment of the amounts referred to in the foregoing
Agreement of Settlement." The Order was signed on February 19/
1980 and filed on the same date.
On January 27# 1981/ Dopp's counsel filed a Satisfaction of
Judgment acknowledging receipt of the settlement amount and
authorizing and directing the court to enter satisfaction.
Although not conforming with the express direction of the
February 19/ 1980 Order to prepare an Order of Dismissal/ the
Satisfaction of Judgment was clearly intended to culminate the
paternity action.
In or about June of 1987/ Olch caused an Order to Show
Cause to be issued requiring Dopp to appear and show why she
should not be held in contempt for initiating communication
with Olch and his family. The court declined to hold Dopp in
contempt/ but ordered that
It was the intent of the parties that no
communication be instigated between them
or their families and the court now enters
this Order that neither party shall
communicate with the other or their
families in any way/ whether such
communication be written or verbal/ or
through utilizing third parties.
Dopp subsequently brought a Motion to Dismiss with
Prejudice and in the alternative, a Motion to Amend Decree to
allow for communication between the minor child/ Olch and his
family. Both motions were denied. Dopp appeals, contending
that the trial court erred in "sui sponte" entering an order of

870572-CA

2

no communication, in refusing to dismiss the case, in not
amending the "decree" based on "changed circumstances", and in
denying appellant attorney fees.
The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity establishes that the
father of a child born out of wedlock is liable to the same
extent as the father of child born in wedlock "for the
reasonable expense of the mother's pregnancy and confinement
and for the education, necessary support and funeral expenses
of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-l (1987). Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45a-2 (1987) prescribes the means for enforcement of
the father's obligation "[i]f paternity has been determined or
has been acknowledged according to the laws of this state.M
"The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke a
judgment for future education and necessary support." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45a-5 (1987). "An agreement of settlement with
the alleged father is binding only when approved by the
court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-13 (1987).
Dopp's first contention on appeal is that the trial court
erred in "sui sponte" entering an order prohibiting her and her
child from communicating with Olch and his family. This
argument is wholly without merit. Dopp received notice of the
hearing on the order to show cause, appeared at the hearing and
was represented by counsel. The court declined to find Dopp in
contempt, but reiterated the provision of the settlement
approved by the court precluding communication between the
parties or their families.
Dopp next claims that the trial court erred in refusing to
amend the "decree" based on "changed circumstances" consisting
of the emotional problems of the child. This argument
misconstrues the effect of the order of the court approving the
settlement reached between Dopp and Olch. The Utah Uniform Act
on Paternity provides for continuing jurisdiction to modify or
revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support.
See Utah Code Ann. 78-45a-5. The threshold determination is
whether the February 19, 1980 Order is a judgment susceptible
of modification. The Order approves a lump sum settlement of a
disputed paternity action between Dopp and Olch. The Order
does not contain any provision for future support nor does it
establish the paternity of the child. The Order is not a

870572-CA
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judgment susceptible of modification under Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-45a-5.1
Dopp also appeals from the denial of an award of attorney
fees to her. The Utah Uniform Act on Paternity contains no
provision authorizing an award of attorneys fees in paternity
actions. We can find no other basis for an award of attorney
fees under the circumstances of this case and the appellant has
indicated none.
Finally, Dopp contends that the trial court erred in
refusing to dismiss the case. The Stipulation for Settlement
and the Order approving the settlement each provide that upon
payment of the settlement amount, Olch shall cause the case to
be dismissed with prejudice. Rather than prepare a dismissal,
counsel for Olch prepared a Satisfaction of Judgment, with the
apparent intention to culminate the litigation between the
parties insofar as the financial aspects of the settlement

1. We do not have before us in this case the issue of whether
the parties could validly waive the child's right to support,
and we, therefore, decline to rule upon the effect of an order
approving a settlement of the support rights of the minor
child. The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Huck v. Huck, 734 P.2d
417, 419 (1986), that the parents of a child could not, by
agreement, waive that child's right to support. See also Reick
v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917 (Utah 1982); Strong v. Strong, 548
P.2d 626, 627-28 (Utah 1976). Our determination does not
require a resolution of that issue. Instead, our holding that
the present Order does not invoke the trial court's continuing
jurisdiction is based on the literal terms of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45a-5 providing that continuing jurisdiction is dependent
upon the existence of a judgment for future support. Similarly,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-2, referring to enforcement of the
liabilities of the father of a child born out of wedlock,
requires a determination that a parental relationship exists
under the laws of this state. The February 1980 order approving
the settlement satisfies neither of those prerequisites. The
Order makes no determination of paternity and contains no
judgment for future support. Similarly, although Dopp
purportedly entered the settlement as guardian ad litem of her
child, this Court does not have before it and makes no
determination of the effect of the order on any future action by
or on behalf of the child to adjudicate paternity and establish
the right to support.

870572-CA
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between Dopp and Olch are concerned. Appellants motion before
the trial court sought relief in the alternative: either an
order dismissing the case with prejudice or an order amending
the "decree" to modify the non-communication provision. The
strategy suggests that Dopp believes the dismissal of the case
would nullify the non-communication agreement. That contention
is erroneous. The settlement/ having been approved by the
trial court, is binding upon the parties and the
non-communication clause is subject to enforcement by the trial
court. Dismissal of the case, although contemplated by the
February 1980 Order, would not relieve Dopp and Olch of the
requirements of their settlement, particularly where Olch has
paid the amount set forth in the agreement.
The Order of the trial court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

Regnal W. Garff, Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

870572-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 7th day of January, 1988, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision was mailed to each
of the following:
Robert B. Hansen
Attorney for Appellant
320 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert Felton
Attorney at Law
5 Triad Center, Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah
84180
HON. James S. Sawaya
Third District Court
Salt Lake County
Civil No. C-78-6634

Ju^Tia C.\ WfiTtfield
Cas4 Management Clerk
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Robert Felton, 1056
5 .Triad Center, Suite>585
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Phone: (801) 359-9216
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT IN AND POR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

? 9) &

*»

Sn

* * * * * * * * *

KATHY ANN DOPP,

'-W+s

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

o

)
)

CO

in_

Q lb <

)

JONATHAN OLCH,

C i v i l No.

C78-6634

)
)
* * * * * * * * *

Defendant.
TO:

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Kathy Ann Dopp
You are hereby ordered and required to appear before+the

Honorable Cfi**^

S: 5*Ar*y\%

Judge of the above-entitled court at
a

Pv+JU

240 East 4th South* Salt Lake City. Utah on tfie / $/-

day of *M*y,

1987 at the hour of l,Vd

p./*\

o'clock then and there to show

cause why you should not be found In contempt of this Court for
violating the Order entered on or about February 19, 1980
demanding that you not contact the Defendant or members of his
family.
You are also further required to appear and show cause why
you should not be ordered to assume and pay the Defendant's legal
fees for the prosecution of this action and why this court should
not take the other action requested In the Verified Motion filed
by the Defendant, including the posting of a bond to ensure
future compliance with this Court's Order*
DATED this

HT

day of rUffisg-y, 1987.

urt: frS

*s*>*
Serve the Defendant at:

i
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(FILMtiOi
TBl?^
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E. Scott Savage
Attorneys for Defendant
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-3333
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SfATE OF UTAH
KATHY ANNE DOPP,
Plaintiff,
AGREEMENf OF SETTLEMENT AND
ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT

- vs JONATHAN OLCH,

C i v i l No. C-78-6634
Defendant.

AGREEMENT
The defendant, Jonathan Olch, and the plaintiff, Kathy
Anne Dopp, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for her
minor child, Alister Fox Dopp, subject to court approval stipulate
and agree to settle the above-entitled matter upon the following
terms:
1.

The plaintiff in her own behalf and as guardian ad

litem of her minor child, Alister Fox Dopp, hereby releases and
forever discharges the defendant of and from any and all claims,
demands, causes of action, damages, actions, suits of law, costs
or expenses of any kind on account of, resulting from, or in any
manner related to (1) any actual or alleged pregnancy confinement,
hospital or medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff, (2) any
education expense, support obligation or inheritance right of
Alister Fox Dopp, or (3) any claim as to the paternity of Alister
Fox Dopp, or (4) any claim otherwise related to the allegations of
the pleadings or the subject matter of the above-entitled
LAW o f n e t s o r
VAN COTT, BAOLEY, CORNWALL ft MCCARTHY
•utrc soo i4i KAST r m r r • O U T M
• A L T L A K l CITY. UTAH • 4 1 1 1

litigation.
2.

The defendant agrees to pay the sum of SIXTEEN

THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and No/100 DOLLARS ($16r500.00).

Said sum

is to be paid as follows:
At least FIVE THOUSAND and No/100 DOLLARS
($5,000.00) is to be paid on or before February 10, 1980.

On

or before the twentieth day of each month thereafter, the
defendant shall pay at least ONE THOUSAND and No/100 DOLLARS
($1,000.00), or the balance of the amount remaining to be
paid, whichever is the lesser sum, until the entire SIXTEEN
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED and No/100 DOLLARS ($16,500.00) and
accrued interest is paid in full.

The plaintiff shall receive

interest on any amount of the $16,500.00 not paid as of
February 11, 1980, at the prevailing rate of interest paid by
banks in Salt Lake County for money market certificates on
said date.

All interest shall be simple interest, computed

but not compounded monthly on only the unpaid balance of the
$16,500.00.

All sums paid shall be applied first to reduce

the principal and only after $16,500.00 has been paid shall
any amount paid be applied to reduce accrued interest.
Nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit or penalize the
early payment of the $16,500.00, or any portion thereof.
3.

All sums paid by the defendant to the plaintiff

pursuant to the terms of this agreement, except for the first
$2,500.00, shall be placed in trust, and the income and principal
of said trust shalL only be used for the education, support or
other benefit of Alister Fox Dopp.
4.

The parties acknowledge that this settlement agree-

ment is a compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that the
said payment received by the plaintiff is not to be construed as

2

-

an admission of liability of the defendant, who expressly denies
any liability to either the plaintiff or Mister Fox Dopp.

The

defendant denies that he is the father of Alister Fox Dopp and
denies that he had or has any rights with respect to said child.
If defendant had or has any rights with respect to said child, he

'I
j hereby waives them, including the right, if any, to consent to
P adoption.
I
,
5. Both parties agree not to initiate any communicai

tions with the other party or members of their family.
6.

The parties agree that upon the payment of the en-

tire $16,500.00 and any accrued interest, the above-entitled
action shall be dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, each
party to bear his or her own costs.
7,

This agreement is conditioned upon the approval of

L the court where the above-entitled action is pending and a dismissal with prejudice of said action.
DATED this

/?

^ — day of February, 1980.

/j
^

KATHY ANME DOPP, jrt^ividually any as Guardian Ad
Litem for Alister Fox Dopp

JONATHAN OLCH

O R D E R
The Court, having read the foregding Agreement of
Settlement, and being advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1.

The foregoing Agreement of Settlement is hereby

2.

This matter is stricken from the trial calendar and

approved.

continued without date.
3.

The defendant shall submit to the Court an Order of

Dismissal upon final payment of the amounts referred to in the
foregoing Agreement of Settlement.
DATED this

/ *7

day of February, 1980.

BY THE COURT:

C

*~AAS

D:
DEAN E. CONDER
District Court Judge

w e£TTE3T

t j r /^':5
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w-W»1g»F««Br
ff. £• i?arc
DART & STEGALL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4 30 Ten Broadway Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 521-6383
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE) COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
-—oooOooo—KATHY ANNE DOPP,

i

Plaintiff,

*

V.

i

JONATHAN OLCH,

j

Defendant.

SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT

Civil No. C-78-6634

:
—-OOOOQOO

Acknowledging receipt of $16,500.00 in full and
complete satisfaction of the judgment heretofore entered in
the above-entitled action, B. L . Dart, attorney for plaintiff,
hereby authorizes and directs the clerk of the above court to
enter such full and complete Satisfaction accordingly.
DATED this

/' '

day Q f January, 19 81.
1

t

By

•V
/

/?

1

/
Syr

IS'*'/

B. L. Dart
Attorney for Plaintiff
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
0n tne

^1

dav of

January, 19 81, personally appeared

before me B.L. Dart, and did acknowledge that he was the attorney
of record for the above-named plaintiff and that he executed
the foregoing.

Commission Expires:
Cyt H

Notary Public
'
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
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Robert Felton, 1056
5 Triad Center
Suite 585
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Phone:
(801) 359-9216
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FORWPWYtl^l

* * * * * * * * *

KATHY ANN DOPP,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,

vs.
JONATHAN OLCH,
Defendant.

ORDER

C^vil No. C-786634
Judge James S. Sawaya

)
* * * * * * * * *

This matter came on for hearing before the Honorable
S. Sawaya, Judge of the above-entitled
pursuant

to the Order

The Court having
for good

Couxtt on June 2 9 , 1987

to Show Cause filed by the Defendant.
reviewed

the pleadings on file herein and

cause appearing now enters this Order as follows:

1.

Plaintiff

2.

It was the intent

is not in contempt

be instigated between
enters

James

this Order

of this Court,

of the parties that no communication

them or their families and the Court now

that neither

other or their families

party shall communicate

in any way, whether such communication be

written or verbal, or through utilizing
DATED

this

'

^

with the

third parties.

' day of J^TO^fry, 198^.

By t h e s a u r i
s

/
Jameji'/S. S a w a y a ,

'

J-cfdge

ATTEST
H. DVAOU HtMuLEY
Chi*
Dowfty Clark
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SUPREME COURT

78-2-2

(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).

Supreme Court jurisdiction [Effective January 1,
1988].
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating in:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and
(v) the state engineer;
(f) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters:
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
7

78-2-2

JUDICIAL CODE

(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (h).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 41; 1987, ch. 161, § 303.
Amended effective January 1, 1988. —
Laws 1987, ch 161, § 303 amends this section
effective January 1, 1988 See catch! me
"Amendment Notes," below
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1986,
ch 47, § 41 repeals former § 78-2-2, as enacted
by Laws 1951, ch 58, § 1, relating to original
appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, and
enacts the above section
Amendment Notes. —- The 1987 amendment, effective January 1,1988, added Subsection (6).
Cross-References. — Appeals from juvenile courts, § 78-3a-51.
Appeals in cnminal cases, U R Cr P 26

Certiorari, Utah Const., Art Vm, Sec. 4;
U R C P 65B
Chief justice to preside over impeachment of
governor, § 77-6-3
Election contest appeals, §§ 20-3-35,
20-15-14
Extraordinary writs, U R C P 65B
Industrial commission orders, review of,
§ 35-1-36
Jurisdiction, Utah Const, Art VIII, Sec 3.
Public service commission orders, exclusive
junsdiction to review, §§ 54-7-16 to 54-7-18
State bar, promulgation of rules, review of
disciplinary orders, §§ 78-51-14, 78-51-19
Unemployment compensation decisions, review of, § 35-4-10

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Appellate jurisdiction
— Probate orders.
Certiorari
Original jurisdiction
—Equity
—Extraordinary writs
Reheanngs
—District judge filling vacancy
—Newly elected justice
Scope of review
In general.
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own
jurisdiction National Bank v Lewis, 13 Utah
507, 45 P 890 (1896)
The Supreme Court is not a court of general
onginal jurisdiction, it is a reviewing court
Nielsen v Utah Nat'l Bank, 40 Utah 95,120 P
211 (1911)
Supreme Court can inquire into its own jurisdiction no matter how that question is called
to its attention and regardless of whether par-

ties desire it to do so Woldberg v Industnal
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P 609 (1929)
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to
hear and determine an appeal is one that can
be raised by the court on its own motion City
of Logan City v Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P.
333 (1929)
Appellate jurisdiction.
—Probate orders.
Final orders in probate were appealable un-
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CHAPTER 23
UTAH EXEMPTIONS ACT
Section
78-23-1.
78-23-2.
78-23-3.

78-23-4.

78-23-5.
78-23-6.
78-23-7.
78-23-8.

Section
Short title.
Definitions.
Homestead exemption -— Excepted
obligations — "Head of family"
defined — Water rights and interests — Conveyance of homestead — Married homestead
claimant — Sale and disposition of homestead.
Declaration of homestead — Filing
— Contents — Failure to file —
Conveyance by married person
— No execution sale if bid less
than exemption — Redemption
rights of judgment creditor.
Property exempt from execution.
Property exempt from execution to
extent necessary for support.
Exemption of unmatured life insurance contracts.
Exempt property up to aggregate
value of $500 — Exemption of
implements, professional books,

78-23-9.

78-23-10.
78-23-11.
78-23-12.
78-23-13.

78-23-14.
78-23-15.

tools, motor vehicle up to
$1,500.
Exemption of proceeds from property sold, taken by condemnation, lost, damaged, or destroyed — Tracing exempt
property and proceeds.
Allowable claims against exempt
property.
Waiver of exemptions in favor of
unsecured creditor unenforceable.
Exertion of individual's rights by
spouse, dependent or other authorized person.
Injunctive relief, damages, or both
allowed against creditor to prevent violation of chapter —
Costs and attorney's fees.
Property held by joint tenants or
tenants in common.
Exemption provisions applicable in
bankruptcy proceedings.

78-23-1- Short title.
This chapter shall be known and may be ^ited as the "Utah Exemptions
Act."
History: C. 1953, 78-23-1, enacted by L.
1981, ch. I l l , § 1.
Repeals and Enactments. — Laws 1981,
ch. I l l , § 1 repealed former § 78-23-1 (L.
1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-23-1; L.
1969, ch. 18, § 9.103(2)(c)), relating to property
exempt from execution, and enacted present
§ 78-23-1.
Cross-References. — County property,
§ 17-15-13.
Firemen's Retirement Act, benefits exempt,
§ 49-6a-36.
Governmental Immunity Act, execution not
to issue against governmental entity,
§ 63-30-22.
Housing authority's property exempt, obligees excepted, waiver, § 55-18-23.
Judges' Retirement Act, payments and contributions exempt, § 49-7a-33.
Mechanics' liens, building materials not subject to execution except for purchase money,
§ 38-1-23.

Military property exempt, § 39-1-47.
Military property wrongfully used, fines,
§ 39-1-48.
Occupational Disease Disability Law, § 352-35.
Partner's interest not subject to execution
except on claim against partnership, § 48-1-22.
Public aid for dependent mothers exempt,
§ 17-13-9.
Public assistance payments, § 55-15-32.
Public Safety Retirement Act, § 49-11-43.
Public transit district property, § 11-20-57.
Salaries of public officials and employees,
§ 78-27-15.
School board property, § 53-4-12.
School employees' retirement benefits,
§§ 53-29-46, 53-29-56.
State Retirement Act, § 49-10-48.
Unemployment compensation, § 35-4-18.
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, §§ 70C-1101 et seq., 70C-7-101 et seq.
Workmen's compensation, § 35-1-80.
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78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing
inherent risks and limitations on liability.
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing,
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act.
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4.
Meaning of "this act". — See note following same catchhne in notes to § 78-27-51.

78-27-55. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L 1979, ch.
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of

skiing and the statute of limitations on such
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1.

78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or defense in bad faith.
In civil actions, where not otherwise provided by statute or agreement, the
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court
determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not
brought or asserted in good faith.
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Without merit" and "good faith."
A frivolous action having no basis in law or
fact is "without merit," but is nevertheless in
"good faith" as long as there is an honest belief

that it is appropriate, and as long as there is no
intent to hinder, delay, defraud or take advantage of another Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149
(Utah 1983).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Mentless Actions, 1984 Utah L Rev 593
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
state statute or rule subjecting party making
untrue allegations or denials to payment of
costs or attorneys' fees, 68 A.L R 3d 209.

Attorneys' fees as recoverable in fraud action, 44 A L R 4th 776.
Attorneys' fees obduracy as basis for statecourt award, 49 A L R 4 t h 825
Award of counsel fees to prevailing party
hase^
o n adversary's bad faith, obduracy, or
o t h e r m i s c o n d u c t , 31 A.L R. Fed. 833.

78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees — Reciprocal rights to recover
attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in
a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees.
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